Abstract
This paper reviews international and domestic evidence on the effects of three types of high school exit exam systems: voluntary curriculum-based external exit exams, universal curriculum-based external exit exam systems and minimum competency tests that must be passed to receive a regular high school diploma. The nations and provinces that use Universal CBEEES (and typically teacher grades as well) to signal student achievement have significantly higher achievement levels and smaller differentials by family background than otherwise comparable jurisdictions that base high stakes decisions on voluntary college admissions tests and/or teacher grades. The introduction of Universal CBEEES in New York and North Carolina during the 1990s was associated with large increases in math achievement on NAEP tests.
Research on MCTs and high school accountability tests is less conclusive because these systems are new and have only been implemented in one country. Cross-section studies using a comprehensive set of controls for family background have not found that students in MCT states score higher on audit tests like the NAEP that carry no stakes for the test taker.
The analysis reported in table 1 tells us that the five states that introduced MCTs during the 1990s had significantly larger improvements on NAEP tests than states that made no change in their student accountability regime. The gains, however, are smaller than for the states introducing Universal CBEEES. New York and North Carolina. The most positive finding about MCTs is that students in MCT states earn significantly more during the first eight years after graduation than comparable students in other states suggesting that MCTs improve employer perceptions of the quality of the recent graduates of local high schools.
High School Exit Examinations: When Do Learning Effects Generalize?
High-stakes national exams, the SAT-1 and ACT, have been a rite of passage in America for more than a half a century. These college entrance exams are offered by two private organizations that are independent of the state education departments that set the curriculum and fund K-12 education.. Competitive pressures to keep unit costs low and attract customers-universities and students--from all fifty states prevent these tests from being comprehensive measures of learning during high school.
1 As Harvard's admissions director put it shortly after the college switched to the SAT-1, "Learning in itself has ceased to be the main factor [in college admissions] . The aptitude of the pupil is now the leading consideration (Gummere, 1943 p. 5) ."
Most other nations have a very different approach to measuring academic achievement at the end of high school and signaling that information to universities and other interested parties. In Australia, Denmark, England, Scotland, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and many Canadian and German provinces, for example, high school exit examinations are developed by (or under the supervision of) the same Ministry of Education that establishes content standards for each subject, funds K-12 education and regulates the training and licensing of teachers. Taken over a period of two weeks or more, exams for each academic subject are about three hours long and require students to write essays, describe experiments and show how they solved multi-step problems. All students are typically required to take exams in a few core fields but students select the rest of their exam subjects. These universal curriculum-based external exit examination systems (Universal CBEEES) certify the learning of all students, not just those planning to go to university. The exams signal many different levels of achievement not just whether a student has exceeded a minimum standard. Doing poorly on these exams typically does not prevent one from graduating from secondary school; one completes high school with a record of modest accomplishment. Exam grades influence college admissions decisions just as the ACT and SAT-1 do in the U.S. They are requested on job applications, appear on resumes and often influence hiring decisions. The questions used in the exams and the distribution of exam grades for each school are reported and discussed in local and national newspapers. The stakes are high for both students and schools. These examination systems are designed to simultaneously achieve four goals: induce teachers to set high standards, motivate students to learn what is being taught, recognize and reward them when they do and assist in the sorting of students across different post-secondary programs and employment options. The high stakes generated by the use of grades on these curriculumbased external exit exams in admissions and hiring decisions is what gives the examinations the leverage to achieve the other three goals of the system.
Students from these nations study harder than American students (Loveless, 2001 ) and did much better on TIMSS mathematics and science assessments at the end of uppersecondary school (Mullis et al, 1998; Takahira et al, 1998 The paper reviews empirical evidence on the effects of these three different approaches to assessing achievement and signaling it to students, parents, colleges, employers and the local community: It begins by describing the critical features of these approaches to signaling and accountability and how they contrast with the system of student stakes built around aptitude tests and teacher grades that prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s. Section 2 explains the theory of action behind the expectation that these new signaling/accountability systems will raise teacher standards and student effort and achievement above the levels that prevail when diplomas are based on seat time and high stakes college admission decisions are based largely on teacher grades and three-hour long multiple-choice format aptitude tests. The third section of the paper reviews the empirical literature on the effects of voluntary and universal curriculumbased external exit examinations and minimum competency examinations on learning, school attendance and labor market outcomes. The final section of the paper analyzes the impact of changes in state policies regarding signaling and accountability on gains in 8 th grade NAEP mathematics achievement since 1990.
I. Deconstructing Systems for Signaling Achievement and Holding Students Accountable
Exactly how are domestic student accountability strategies similar to or different from the 6. Are collections of end-of-course exams? End-of-course exams assess the content of specific courses (or sequences of courses). Assessment becomes better aligned with instruction, so teachers become more accountable. This also tends to align the interests of teachers, students and parents. Grades on end-of-course exams are often a part of the overall course grade further integrating the external exam into the classroom culture.
7. Signal multiple levels of achievement in the subject. If only a pass-fail signal is generated by an exam and passing is necessary to graduate, the standard will almost inevitably to be set low enough to allow almost everyone to pass after multiple tries. The bulk of students who can easily pass the test are not induced to work harder (Becker and Rosen 1992; Costrell 1994; Betts and Costrell 2001) . CBEEES signal achievement levels, so all students, not just those at the bottom of the class, have an incentive to study hard. Consequently, CBEEES should have a more pervasive effect on classroom culture than MCTs and SBEs.
8. Assess more difficult material. Since CBEEES signal the full range of achievement in the subject, they contain more difficult questions and problems. This induces teachers to spend more time on cognitively demanding skills and topics. MCTs (and SBEs to a lesser extent) are designed to identify which students have failed to surpass a minimum standard, so they tend not to ask difficult questions.
America's college admissions tests-the SAT-1 and ACT-have some of these features: #1, #2, #7 and #8. However, they fail to satisfy four of the criteria defining Universal CBEEES. They are not controlled by the state education departments that fund and regulate K-12 education (#3), they are voluntary and so a sizable minority of students do not participate (#4), they cover only a small part of what students study during high school (#5) and they are not tied to specific courses and curricula (#6). Now let's take a closer look at the three types of high school exit exams that have become increasingly important over the last 30 years.
Minimum Competency and Standards-Based Graduation Exams
Twenty-one states required students in the graduating class of 2005 to pass a series of tests before they were awarded a regular high school diploma (Quality Counts 2005. p. 91).
According to a report of the Center on Education Policy (2004) pass the MCT/SBE on the first try without special preparation. The higher standards are experienced by the students who are in the school's least challenging courses. School administrators want to avoid high failure rates, so they are expected to focus additional energy and resources on raising standards in the early grades and improving the instruction received by struggling students. There is a danger, however, that teaching to such a test may narrow or 'dumb down' the curriculum for the majority of students who are not at risk of failing (Koretz et al 2001; Linn 2000 Linn , 2003 . 
Voluntary Curriculum-Based External Exit Examinations

Universal Curriculum-Based External Exit Examination Systems
In 1994 the New York City Board of Education decided that starting with those entering 9 th grade in the fall of 1994, all students would have to take 3 Regents level math and 3 Regents level science courses before graduating. Two years later the State Board of Regents voted to require all students in the state to take Regents level courses in English, mathematics, American history, global history and a science and to pass the associated Regents exams.
Ninth graders in 1996 were the first group to be affected. Ninth graders in 1999 had to pass all five exams. Supporting changes were also made in elementary and middle school curricula and school accountability tests. 
Holding Secondary Schools Accountable
Formal systems for holding schools accountable are also growing in popularity. Forty-nine states publish school report cards and sixteen states have a formal mechanism for rewarding schools either for year-to-year gains in achievement test scores or for exceeding student achievement targets. Thirty-six states have special assistance programs to help failing schools turn themselves around. If improvements are not forthcoming, twenty-four states have the power to close down, take over or reconstitute failing schools (Quality Counts 2004, p.106-8) . These tests typically carry low or no stakes for students but potentially moderate or high stakes for teachers and school administrators. The lack of real consequences is likely to result in many high school students not putting much effort into answering constructed response questions of tests that are not part of a course grade.
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II. Why are CBEEES and MCTs Hypothesized to Increase True Learning?
The purpose of the educational enterprise is learning. Engagement is essential to achieving this purpose. Students must come to school, pay attention, do homework, engage with the subject and construct their new knowledge in ways that allow them to retrieve it later. How are students induced to do all this hard work? Teachers try to make their subject interesting, but sixty-one percent of American students, nevertheless, say they "often feel bored" (OECD 2002 p. 330).
Additional motivators---diplomas, grades, exit exams, college admissions, etc.-are therefore essential. We assess each student's learning, we honor it in ceremonies and signal (describe) it to parents, employers and colleges expecting them to reward the learning in their own way.
The prospect of these external rewards strengthens incentives for students to attend school, participate in class and become engaged in learning. How these rewards manifest themselves also influences the priority that parents, school board members, teachers and administrators place on hiring better teachers, setting higher standards for students versus keeping school taxes low. Debates about MCTs and CBEEES are, at their root, debates about whether additional motivators are needed and how they should be structured.
The education leaders, politicians and policy analysts who support MCTs and/or CBEEES typically make the following arguments:
• Technical change and globalization have substantially increased the economic payoff to all types of academic and technical skills, so the current generation of students needs to achieve at higher levels than earlier generations.
• Many of the employers that offer good jobs have lost confidence in the high school diploma as a guarantor of literacy, numeracy and competence and, as a result, have become reluctant to hire recent high school graduates. States that force schools to set higher graduation standards by making the diploma contingent on passing a minimum competency test will raise achievement and help graduates get better jobs. This hypothesis is tested in the next section.
• The high stakes attached to the ACT and the old SAT-1--tests that have little relationship to the high school curriculum--undermine incentives for students to develop high-level skills in history, science, foreign language, writing and English literature ( • Economists who have analyzed learning incentives agree that teacher grades are valuable motivators for students to try hard in class. The incentive effects of external assessments are different but complementary to the incentive effects of teacher grades (, Becker and Rosen 1992; Costrell 1994; Betts and Costrell 2001, Powell 1996) . • Teacher assessments contribute a great deal to the valid assessment of student learning.
Many important instructional goals can also be assessed externally and these assessments add a new and important perspective to the evaluation of learning. ( The proposal is then that Universal CBEEES should supplement teacher grades, not replace them. When information from multiple sources is used, learning is measured more validly and the high stakes decisions that are based on the information should become better informed.
Incentives to learn should strengthen. Opportunities for students and parents to game the system by seeking out easy graders or pressuring teachers to set lower learning standards should diminish (Competitiveness Policy Council 1993). Figlio and Lucas (2001) have found that even though students learn substantially more when their teacher is a tough grader, parents do "not perceive tougher teachers to be better teachers (p. 20)." Difficult homework assignments intrude on parents' time and often put the family under stress, so parents complain. This may be one of the reasons why 30 percent of American teachers feel pressured "to reduce the difficulty and amount of work you assign and "to give higher grades than students' work deserves" (Hart 1995) ." When the only signal of student achievement is teacher grades, parents seem to prefer high grades not high standards.
Teachers who work in systems with external exams are aware of their tendency to protect them from pressures to lower standards. When a proposal was tabled in Ireland to drop the nation's system of external assessments and have teachers assess students for certification purposes, the union representing Ireland's secondary school teachers reacted as follows:
Major strengths of the Irish educational system have been: Ireland, Flyer, 1990, p. 1) In the U.S. locally elected school boards and the administrators they hire make the thousands of decisions that determine academic expectations and program quality. Accountability advocates claim that when external assessment is absent, students and their parents benefit little in the near term from administrative decisions that opt for higher standards, more qualified teachers or a heavier student workload. The immediate consequences of such decisions are largely negative: higher local property taxes, more homework, having to repeat courses, lower GPA's, complaining parents and a higher risk of not graduating on time (Finn 1991 , Ravitch 1995 . Tests of some of these hypotheses are presented in section 3.
Opponents of external exams argue that focusing student attention on extrinsic rewards for learning will weaken student's intrinsic motivation to learn. George Madaus, for example, hypothesizes that "test scores come to be regarded by parents and students as the main, if not the sole, objective of education" and the result is "undue attention to material that is covered in the examinations, thereby excluding from teaching and learning many worthwhile educational objectives and experiences (1991b p. 7)." Madaus also points out that "preparation for high stakes tests often emphasizes rote memorization and cramming of students and drill and practice teaching methods" and that "some kinds of teaching to the test permits students to do well in examinations without recourse to higher levels of cognitive activity (1991 p. 7-8) ." Some tests of these hypotheses are presented in the next section.
Advocates of external exams argue to the contrary that the end-of-course examinations developed by committees of experienced teachers are generally better than the teacher made final exams they replace. 5 Proposed questions are carefully reviewed for ambiguity and bias and then pre-tested. The exams are published shortly after test day and receive another round of intense public scrutiny. States are trying to push teachers to give students better instruction in writing by adding externally set essay exams to their state testing programs. Well designed essay questions can also enliven class discussions and induce better teaching (see example in endnote). happy with who they are--nearly half wished they were in a different crowd (145-6).
James S. Coleman explains this phenomenon in the following way: "students who get especially high grades create negative externalities for other students, insofar as the teacher grades on the
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curve….Often a norm arises in this case…; students impose a norm that restricts the amount of effort put into schoolwork (1990 p. 251) ." External exams may be one way of changing student perceptions they are being graded on a curve. On external exams, everyone in the class can get an A. One is competing with anonymous students in other schools, not ones classmates. Peers should become less supportive of students who joke around in class or try to get the class off track and more supportive of those who cooperate with the teacher. Improved classroom culture should result in students learning more (Coleman et al 1997) .
III. Do CBEEES and MCT/SBEs Increase True Learning?
Evidence from studies analyzing nationally representative data sets.. Bishop (1996 Bishop ( , 1997 found that 13 year old students from countries with medium and high stakes Universal CBEEE systems outperformed students from other countries at a comparable level of economic development by 1.3 U.S. grade level equivalents (GLE) in science and by 1.0 GLE in mathematics. Analysis of data from the 1990-01 International
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement's study of the reading literacy of 14 year olds in 24 countries found that students in countries with Universal CBEEES were about 1.0 GLE ahead of students in nations that lacked a Universal CBEEES (Bishop 1999 ). Analysis of data from both waves of TIMSS data collection also implies that Universal CBEEES have highly significant effects (of about 1.5 GLEs) on the math and science achievement in 8 th grade (Bishop 2003) . Analyses of year 2000 data on 15 year olds from the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) also yields large statistically significant estimated effects of CBEEES on reading, mathematics and science literacy of native-born students (Bishop 2003) . Achievement gaps between high and low SES students are also significantly lower in nations that have a Universal CBEEES (Bishop and Mane 2004) Four other studies (Ludger Wößmann (2000 , 2003a , 2003b Fuchs and Wößmann 2004) have conducted hierarchical analyses of the entire TIMSS and PISA micro data sets and included a comprehensive set of controls for family background, teacher characteristics, school resources and policies at the individual and school level. Wößmann (2000) CBEEES were a statistically significant one-half of a U.S grade level equivalent ahead in math and science of comparable students living in provinces without Universal CBEEES (Bishop 1997 (Bishop , 1999a and North Carolina in 1996-98 were about one-half of a GLE ahead of comparable students in other states in reading, math and science. In these cross section analyses state minimum competency tests had small (less than 10 percent of a GLE) non-significant effects on achievement Bishop 2001, Jacob 2001) .
What was the primary mechanism by which Universal CBEEES increase student achievement? The impacts of Universal CBEEES on school policies and instructional practices have been studied in the TIMSS data and in the Canadian International Assessment of Educational Progress data. Universal CBEEES were not associated with higher teacher-pupil ratios nor greater spending on K-12 education. They were, however, associated with higher minimum standards for entry into the teaching profession, higher teacher salaries, a greater likelihood of having teachers specialize in teaching one subject in middle school and a greater likelihood of hiring teachers who have majored in the subject they will teach. Teacher satisfaction with their job was significantly lower, possibly because of the increased pressure for accountability that results from the existence of good signals of individual student achievement.
Schools in Universal CBEEES jurisdictions devote significantly more hours to math and science instruction and build and equip better science labs. For homework time the Canadian and TIMSS studies got contradictory results (Bishop 1996 (Bishop , 1997 (Bishop , 1999b .
What about the quality of instruction and student attitudes toward the subject? Students in Universal CBEEES nations and Canadian provinces were significantly less likely to say that memorization is the way to learn the subject and significantly more likely to do experiments in science class. Quizzes and tests were significantly more common in Canadian CBEEES provinces, but in other respects these provinces were not significantly different on a variety of indicators of pedagogy. They were just as likely to enjoy the subject and they were significantly more likely to believe that science is useful in every day life and more likely to talk with their parents about school work. Students in the TIMSS study were significantly more likely to get tutoring assistance from teachers after school. Madaus's prediction that students would avoid opportunities to learn material that is not likely to be on the exam was not supported. Students in Canadian provinces with CBEEES spent significantly more time reading for fun and watching science documentaries (Bishop 1996) . The study using TIMSS data found no relationship between CBEEES and reading for fun. (Bishop 1999b) .
Do CBEEES Improve the Functioning of Decentralized Education Systems?
Advocates of external measurement of student achievement with important stakes attached argue that it will improve the functioning of decentralized education systems. Parents will be better able to judge which schools are doing a good job. The information will influence choice of school and strengthen competitive pressures for excellence. Ministries of Education no longer need to try to improve education quality by rigidly specifying inputs-teacher qualifications, salaries, budget allocations and textbooks. Instead, teachers and school administrators can be given authority to use their local knowledge about teacher talents and budget circumstances to maximize school quality (Finn 1991 , Ravitch 1995 . Publishing data on achievement, it is hypothesized, creates accountability pressures that induce teachers and administrators to place greater emphasis on improving academic achievement. Tests of these hypotheses have been supportive. Bishop's (1999b) analysis of IAEP data found that controlling on student background, math achievement of students in private schools was higher only in the provinces that required externally set diploma exams at the end of secondary school. Analyzing TIMSS and PISA data, Ludger Wößmann (2002 Wößmann ( , 2003b found that school autonomy over salaries and teacher influence over course content, textbooks and budget allocations had positive effects on student achievement in nations with external exams. In nations without external exams, by contrast, high levels of school and teacher autonomy were associated with lower student achievement. This is a promising line of research. Since changes in school governance and autonomy are commonly proposed as a way to make schools more efficient, it is critical that we understand how the effects of school choice and autonomy are influenced by the measurement and signaling of student achievement.
Does Better Signaling of Achievement Influence School Attendance and Labor Market
Success?
What effects do high stakes curriculum-based external exit exam systems have on high school enrollment rates and college attendance? Many believe a tradeoff exists between the standards and quality of an educational system and the number of students who can or will stay in school into their late teens and twenties. Bishop and Mane (2004) recently evaluated the effects of Universal CBEEES on school enrollment rates of 15 to 19 year olds and of 20-24 year olds, uppersecondary graduation rates and years spent in school using Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development data. Universal CBEEES had no significant effect on any of these indicators. The statistically significant predictors were per capita GDP and the share of uppersecondary students in pre-vocational and career-technical educational programs.
Well-controlled cross-section studies of aggregate state level data have concluded that enrollment rates and graduation rates are negatively related to the total number Carnegie units required to graduate. These studies found no tendency for aggregate completion rates to be significantly lower in states with MCT or SBEs ( Students with low or average GPAs in 8 th grade were significantly more likely to get their diploma late or to get a GED when they were from New York or a state with an MCT/SBE. The proportion of 8 th graders who eventually got either a regular diploma or a GED was no different in New York but significantly lower for low GPA students from other MCT/SBE states (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 2001) . As in Europe, fast paced instruction and high standards for getting an academic diploma results in some students taking longer to get the diploma and other students switching over to less demanding programs of study.
Critics of high stakes testing argue that teaching to exit exams diminish the time spent on more important skills that would help students in college and in jobs. If this were the case, we would expect students in states with graduation tests to be less likely to go to and stay in college and less likely to get good jobs. When this was tested, however, eighth graders in states with high school exit exams were found to be more likely to go to college and equally likely to graduate from college (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 2001; Bishop and Mane 2005) .
Economic theory predicts that raising graduation standards will improve the average quality of high school graduates and raise their mean wage and earnings (Betts and Costrell 2001) . Analysis of HSB and NELS-88 data support this prediction and contradicts claims to the contrary. Controlling on high school completion, college attendance and local labor market characteristics, students from states with MCTs earned significantly more--9 percent more in the calendar year following graduation--than students from states without a MCT. The MCTs also helped recent graduates get jobs that offered better opportunities for training and advancement (Bishop, Mane, Moriarty and Bishop 2001) . As a result, eight years after graduating from high school, those growing up in MCT states earned between $1100 and $2000
per year more than those who had attended high school in states without graduation exams (Bishop and Mane 2005) . Diplomas that reflect both teacher judgments and external exams appear to be worth more in the labor market than diplomas awarded for seat time only or GED certificates based solely on test scores.
IV. Effects of Introducing High School Exit Exams on Achievement Gains since 1990
Another way to assess the effects of exit exams is to compare achievement gains in Subsequent studies have all examined data from the 1990s a period during which many states were introducing standards-based reform strategies holding schools accountable for improving student achievement. The indexes of high-stakes testing used in these studies largely reflect the growth of school accountability testing systems not high school exit examinations. Martin Carnoy and Susanna Loeb (2003) found that 4 th and 8 th grade math achievement gains from 1996 to 2000 were significantly larger in states with strong test-based accountability. Effects were particularly strong for Blacks and Hispanics and remained large when adjustments were made for changes in exclusion rates. Raymond (2003a, 2005 ) also report that states introducing test-based accountability tended to have larger test score gains from 4 th to 8 th grade. They also conclude special education placement rates did not rise more rapidly in states introducing test-based accountability. Barak Rosenshine (2003) excluded states with big increases in exclusion rates and then compared four-year NAEP test score gains of the remaining high-stakes states to the gains in states with no stakes. He concluded "that students in the clear high-stakes states were, indeed, learning mathematics and reading that was beyond the specific content of the statewide tests (p. 3)." Henry Braun (2004) study of gains between 1992 and 2000 concluded: "For each grade, when we examine the relative gains of states over the period, we find that the comparisons strongly favor the highstakes testing states. Moreover, the results cannot be accounted for by differences between the two groups of states with respect to changes in the percent of students excluded from NAEP over the same period (p. 2)." Table 1 . The coefficients on the exclusion variables imply that an increase in exclusion rates removes from the NAEP sample students who tend to score about 68 points (5.6 GLEs) below the statewide average. This is a high but not implausible estimate of the size of the bias that results. When this variable is dropped (compare row 2 to row 3 or row 6 to row 7), coefficients on the school and student accountability variables hardly change at all. Carnoy and Loeb (2003) and Braun (2004) came to similar conclusions about the lack of an effect of changing exclusion rates on estimates of the effect of high stakes testing for school accountability. Probably the most important finding of the paper is the remarkable ability of European style Universal CBEEES to substantially increase academic achievement without decreasing school enrollment and graduation rates. Minimum competency graduation requirements, by contrast, clearly have much smaller (possibly no) effects on achievement and also reduce the number of students getting a regular high school diploma.
Why are European Universal CBEEES so much more successful? First, they signal the full range of student achievement to universities and to employers, so all students get increased rewards--better jobs and access to preferred university programs-if they study harder. An MCT, by contrast, focuses all of its high stakes incentive effects on a few low achieving students who were already at high risk of dropping out. Most students pass the MCT on the first try.
Once they pass, the stimulus to studying and paying attention in class generated by the MCT goes away. Only in the minority of very troubled schools where the majority of students are at risk of failing the MCE is student culture likely to be changed by the high stakes test.
Second, doing poorly on a European Universal CBEEE means you graduate with a record of modest accomplishment. It does not prevent you from graduating altogether.
Employers and universities take that record into account when they make their decisions.
Students with poor exam grades are able to enter less prestigious forms of postsecondary education.
Thirdly, end-of-course exams pressure individual teachers to improve their teaching. Their colleagues will know how their students do on the exam. Since the stakes for the students are high, parents and school administrators are likely to encourage them to set high standards.
MCTs, by contrast, typically cover material studied in many different courses taught by different teachers. Sometimes they are administered in the fall. Under these circumstances, individual teachers are not considered responsible for how students taking their class this term do on the MCT test. When everyone is responsible for student performance, no one is responsible.
Fourthly, the component exams of these Universal CBEEES are more challenging and higher in quality than the MCT and SBE exams that dominate student accountability in the U.S.
The challenge and quality of an exam depend on the level and complexity of the tasks students are required to perform, not the percent correct pass-fail cut score. The primary goal of any high or moderate stakes exam should be improving teaching and learning. Teachers should be proud to be preparing their students to take it. The long-term political viability of standardsbased reform depends on our ability to improve quality and credibility of the exams used to measure student achievement.
